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Using Financial Markets to Analyze History: 
The Case of the Second World War 
Bruno S. Frey & Daniel Waldenström ∗ 
Abstract: »Vom Nutzen der Analyse von Finanzmärkten für 
die Geschichtswissenschaft. Eine Untersuchung anhand des 
2. Weltkrieges«. This article presents the analysis of finan-
cial markets as a supplementary method to the traditional 
historiographic approach by investigating the perception of 
events before and during World War II. This approach con-
stitutes an alternative to written sources, which are often bi-
ased and commonly do not represent the opinions held in 
the wider public. In the following, the financial markets ap-
proach is used to analyse the perception and anticipation of 
events before and during the World War II in France, Ger-
many, Denmark, and Norway. Thereby, price data of long-
term government bonds for these countries traded in Zurich 
and Stockholm are used. The presented evidence challenges 
some common held views, e.g., it can be shown that the in-
vasion of Norway was in part anticipated by contemporar-
ies. Although both methods rely on interpretation the finan-
cial markets approach is based on a fundamentally different 
type of source. Therefore, it can be used as a supplement to 
the traditional approach.  
1. How are countries affected by wars? 
A central aspect of historical research is to provide explanations for the causes 
and effects of events that occurred in the past. In order to be more concrete, a 
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major war, in particular the Second World War, will be considered such a 
historical event. History can be analyzed and explained from different perspec-
tives. This paper considers two such perspectives, the first being the traditional 
historiographic approach, in which the main emphasis is on the qualitative 
analysis of various kinds of historical sources and documents, and the second 
being what we call the financial market approach, a recent methodology for 
linking significant changes in historical market prices to simultaneously occur-
ring geopolitical events. This study seeks to identify the fundamental character-
istics of the two approaches and how they compare in answering some impor-
tant historical questions concerning the Second World War.  
Historians of the Second World War generally ask many important ques-
tions in order to comprehend the main causes of war and its impact on societies 
and their citizens. This study focuses on three of these questions, which are 
suitable for analysis using historical financial market data. The first question is: 
How are countries affected by wars? This is a broad, descriptive question, 
aimed at characterizing the war’s main course of events, with special attention 
given to the idiosyncratic elements in the histories of different countries. The 
second question is: Did the contemporaries anticipate the outbreak of the war? 
This question does not focus on the actual war, but rather on the period just 
before its outbreak and, more precisely, on the existence of threat assessments 
among the contemporaries. There are many possible answers, depending what 
groups in society are targeted. For example, the perceived threat of war on the 
part of political and military leaders might (for informational or other reasons) 
differ from the threat of war perceived by the general public. Both groups are 
worth considering, particularly the latter, since it constitutes quite an important 
group in democratic societies when analyzing a country’s actions. Our third 
question is: What were the important turning points of the war? This is an issue 
that all war historiographies like to dwell upon, and the answer could be sig-
nificant. According to historians, a turning point is typically the first event in a 
series of incidents that eventually turn out to be important for the outcome of 
the war. Still, if one wishes to highlight the turning points that were regarded as 
important at the time of the war by the contemporaries actively engaged in it, 
an entirely unique set of dates may show up as turning points. Even if these 
events turn out later not to have any lasting impact on the war, they may be 
crucial in understanding the decisions made by people at the time. Hence, de-
pending on the focus of the research question, it may vary as to which approach 
is most suitable.  
Section II of this paper presents a critical discussion of the two analytical 
perspectives under comparison in this study: the traditional historiography 
approach and the financial market approach. Specific emphasis will be put on 
describing the latter, since the former has been the conventional standard 
among historians for a long time and needs no further introduction. Section III 
exemplifies the financial market approach for the case of the Second World 
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War as reflected in the secondary market for government bonds, which is stud-
ied for various countries. Section IV presents the results from the empirical 
analysis of bond market prices, and Section V presents a comparison between 
these results and the conventional historiographic approach. The final Section 
VI offers conclusions. It will be argued that both approaches rely heavily on 
interpretation – but in different ways. They therefore complement each other in 
a useful way. The analysis of financial markets for highlighting historical 
events is seen as a useful addition to the historians’ tools. It certainly cannot 
substitute for standard analysis, but constitutes an interesting new way of ana-
lyzing history. 
2. Two Analytical Approaches 
History may be analyzed from several perspectives. This study considers two 
such perspectives. First, in the dominant traditional historiography, which we 
will outline only briefly (for more thorough investigations, see, e.g., Garraghan, 
1946 or Howell and Prevenier, 2001), we point out the problems it has with 
providing answers to some of the war questions asked in the introduction. 
Second, we present the more recent methodology, based on analyzing prices 
recorded on historical financial markets. This section identifies the fundamen-
tal distinguishing characteristics.  
2.1 Traditional historiography 
Historians deal with past economic and political events in a certain way. Typi-
cally, they carefully collect facts and interpret them in the light of their general 
knowledge of the field and the particular circumstances prevailing. A major 
problem with this approach is that the interpretation of historians is necessarily 
ex post facto, i.e., with knowledge of later events. This knowledge may bias the 
evaluation of the events, and may lead to “facts” being overlooked or overem-
phasized, as the case may be. This problem is most obvious in the case of wars. 
Once the outcome is known, resulting, for example, in the crushing defeat of 
the country being considered, it is difficult to objectively analyze why the 
decision-makers of the country engaged in the war in the first place. To simply 
refer to a misjudgment is unsatisfactory, because it would require an explana-
tion of how such an error could occur. In order to evaluate the historical situa-
tion existing at any given moment in time, historians have to take care not to 
impute information to the decision-makers of that time, the true nature of 
which was only revealed by later developments. 
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Historians are, of course, well aware of this problem and they make a big ef-
fort to capture the information, views, sentiments and feelings existing at a 
given point in time.1 Written documents are a major source, but sometimes 
surveys are used (oral history). Both approaches may be biased by the strategic 
considerations of the writers and orators. In many cases, the sources have been 
written or spoken in support of a particular cause, and are therefore far from 
reflecting the reality of the situation. In other cases, the authors of documents 
or interviews made a special effort to get themselves into a more prominent 
position, or place themselves in a more beneficial light, again not reflecting the 
true situation. 
Historians tend to focus almost exclusively on various kinds of qualitative 
methods and written sources, such as letters, memoirs, diaries, newspaper arti-
cles etc. Since most of these written pieces of historical evidence reflect the 
views of the individuals who have written them, focusing on this method is not 
really suitable for drawing conclusions about views and opinions of the general 
public in the past. In fact, historians cannot even analyze the views of smaller 
groups in the population in the absence of comparable and contemporaneous 
statements of all the individuals in question. Hence, by mainly focusing on 
making careful in-depth analyses of recorded source materials, historians will 
have a hard time of robustly reproducing the widely held views of people in the 
past concerning various interesting phenomena, such as the existence of pre-
war threats or the credibility of a government’s policies in the eyes of its con-
stituency.  
2.2 The financial markets approach 
In recent years, there has been a growing literature on analyzing political and 
institutional change using historical financial market data. Treating financial 
markets primarily as markets for the dissemination and distribution of informa-
tion, it is possible to derive measures of the impact of political, economic and 
institutional changes on the prices of financial assets. A path-breaking analysis 
shows how events during the U.S. civil war affected the market for “green-
backs”, a special currency issued by the Union (Willard et al. 1996). A number 
of subsequent studies applied this approach to the prices of government bonds 
being traded during the Second World War. Frey and Kucher (2000, 2001) 
made the first studies, analyzing prices in the neutral country of Switzerland. 
Following them, Brown and Burdekin (2002) studied German bonds being 
traded in wartime Britain, and Frey and Waldenström (2004) compared the 
prices of German and Belgian bonds traded simultaneously on the neutral Zu-
                                                             
1  For example, in his famous treatise on history, E. H. Carr describes the writing of history as 
a “continuous process of interaction between the historian and his facts” (Carr 1961: ch. 1). 
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rich and Stockholm stock exchanges. Oosterlinck (2003) analyzed the French 
government bond market during the same period, comparing the prices of pre-
war bonds with bonds issued by the Vichy regime in order to infer the timing 
of the turning point of the war according to French bond traders. Wolfers and 
Zitzewitz (2005) studied the case of the Iraq war.  
The basic methodology followed in all of these papers is to link significant 
changes, called structural break points (see the technical discussion below), in 
the market prices of these financial assets to simultaneously occurring political 
or military events, from which an inference can be made about the impact of 
these events on contemporary society.2 The financial assets that have been most 
commonly analyzed in the literature are government bond prices and yields. 
The underlying idea is that wars put extraordinary pressure on a country’s 
fiscal balances and may, in the worst case, provoke sovereign repudiations or 
defaults. This, in turn, increases the default risk of these government bonds, 
which implies that they should trade at lower prices on the secondary markets.3 
The use of capital market data for these analyses has several advantages. 
Market actors have always had to carefully evaluate the prevailing situation, as 
well as likely future developments, because errors directly affect them in mone-
tary terms. This distinguishes capital market data from other types of data, in 
particular surveys and questionnaires, where errors do not generally affect the 
persons committing them. Financial markets usually have a high predictive 
power, due to so-called marginal traders. This type of trader decides on a rela-
tively unbiased basis, and carefully collects the relevant information. In the 
extreme case, even one such trader can drive the market price to the underlying 
equilibrium price.  
Financial markets thus are not per se related to the nation and population. A 
nation may disappear, but the respective financial assets may survive. Nor-
mally, there is a strong correlation between the fate of a population and/or 
nation and the values of assets traded. In most cases, when a nation ceases to 
exist, its public debt is no longer serviced nor paid back at maturity, a fact 
reflected in the financial markets by a drop in value to zero (if there is no hope 
                                                             
2  The overlap between, on one hand, the general public and political and military decision 
makers and, on the other, the bond traders and investors, is admittedly far from perfect. Yet 
both the public and the market participants acted to a significant extent on publicly avail-
able information, and one would expect their views and expectations about the future to be 
roughly the same. As the political and military leaders had partial access to information 
from the secret services that was not available to the general public, it will be discussed to 
what extent their views differed from those of the public.  
3  These developments may be accompanied by minor changes in other standard bond yield 
determinants, such as the coupon rate, the time to maturity, tax status of cash flows, re-
demption clauses and the discount rate. Although these were mostly constant, the breaks 
estimated use yield spreads (subtracting the Swedish yields), hence cancelling out market-
specific determinants. These estimations produced essentially the same results, and are 
available from the authors upon request. 
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that the debt will ever be repaid). Similarly, if the population of a country is 
negatively affected (say by natural catastrophes or a war), the respective gov-
ernment may be unable to service its public debt, so that the population’s fate is 
again reflected in the financial market. 
The possible split between the fate of the population and the nation, as re-
flected on financial markets, may be advantageous or disadvantageous, depend-
ing on the question asked. In any case, one must be very careful when estab-
lishing a relationship between historical events and movements on financial 
markets. It may be spurious, or change over time, so that any interventions may 
be misleading. 
We hasten to emphasize that we have never considered the analysis of fi-
nancial markets to be a substitute for the traditional inquiries undertaken by 
historians. But it is a challenging complementary method of evaluating the 
situation at a given moment in time. In particular, care must be taken to allow 
for time delays. Thus, a historical fact may have been predicted in advance by 
the people active on the financial markets, in which case the break should be 
visible before the event, or be completely absent, depending on the speed of 
adjustment. Either way, no break is visible at the time of the event itself. Ex-
amples are the outbreak and end of a war, which in many cases are foreseen 
well in advance. It should be noted, however, that financial markets tend to 
overreact to news reaching them. The overreaction hypothesis implies that, 
even though many investors predicted an event way in advance, and financial 
markets adjusted accordingly, a break in the price series can still be identified. 
There are a number of technical considerations to be taken into account 
when using financial market data. The most important of these are the choice of 
econometric method used to statistically estimate so-called structural breaks in 
the time series of each financial asset, and the specific model of asset prices 
chosen for the computations. There are a large number of statistical methods 
for estimating structural breaks in time series. 4 The results in this study are 
based on two of the most common methods in the literature for the estimation 
of multiple structural breaks in univariate time series: Banerjee et al. (1992) 
and Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). Technically, a structural break is defined as a 
lasting significant mean-shift in the series analyzed. Both the researcher and the 
total length of the series determine exactly how long the structural breaks 
should be.5 The great advantage of these methods is that they estimate the 
breaks, using only the information contained in the time series properties and 
not the prior knowledge of what historical events historians consider impor-
                                                             
4  For comprehensive overviews of the time series econometrics of estimating structural 
breaks, see Perron (2006). 
5  Determining the required length of a structural break is associated with the trade-off of 
avoiding both short fluctuations and too long breaks that run the risk of containing more 
than one “true” break. 
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tant.6 This means that the financial market approach is particularly suitable for 
analyzing the true forward-looking assessments of the contemporaries, before 
the subsequent realization of the course of events that later became historical.  
We now turn to the second technical consideration mentioned above: the 
specification of a model of asset prices. The results presented below are based 
on modeling structural breaks in nominal bond prices or bond yields that are 
conditional on shifts in other nominal prices or yields. The term “conditional” 
has to be emphasized since the procedure corrects for effects that influence all 
government bonds traded in a similar way. Therefore, we will not find breaks 
in, say, the German government bond prices as a result of changing inflation or 
real interest rates. This also holds for mean differences: we only test for signifi-
cant structural mean breaks of the bond prices conditional on price movements 
of all government bonds traded in Switzerland. This means that an (historical) 
event with the same effect on the bond prices of all countries will not be recog-
nized by the econometric method used. It also means that an event that leads to, 
say, a ten percent increase in the Swiss government bond prices, and to a five 
percent increase in the prices of all government bonds, will be shown to in-
crease the conditional mean of the Swiss government prices by five percent 
only.  
The analysis of break points undertaken here does not identify historical 
facts, but rather the acquisition and assessment of information relevant for 
bondholders. Wartime events are evaluated with respect to how likely they are 
to affect the probability of having the government bonds correctly serviced and 
repaid. Thus, bond traders do not attempt to pin down what happens for its own 
sake, or for some historical reason, but in order to predict what will happen to 
the bonds they own, or intend to acquire. Some events are important to bond 
investors and influence bond prices, while other events do not affect the per-
ceived probability to service and repay the debt, and therefore are not reflected 
in bond prices. 
The financial market approach is based on the premise that “facts” consid-
ered important by historians are reflected in changing values on capital mar-
kets, in particular by bond prices. However, there are a number of reasons why 
historical “facts” may not show up as break points: 
- A “fact” may be important from the historian’s point of view (it relates 
to the fate of a nation, country or population), but does not affect the 
servicing and payback of the government bonds. 
- The contemporary actors do not evaluate a particular event in the same 
way as historians do decades later. This difference between ex ante and 
                                                             
6  The methods distinguish themselves from so-called “Chow tests” for structural breaks, in 
which a break point is determined beforehand and evaluated accordingly. Perron (2006) 
shows how this approach to the estimation of structural breaks yields invalid and inconsis-
tent results. 
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ex post assessments is a natural characteristic of all kinds of human 
action, but few methods are able to capture it.  
- A “fact” does not exist, nor is it as important as the historians believe. 
Here, the quality of historical research is called into question. However, 
it would be misleading to assume that all historians identify the same 
“facts” as being important. So the issue is which historical school or 
which individual historian has identified what historical “fact”, as well 
as the actual importance attributed to it. 
- The bond market data lacks quality, e.g. because there are too few 
transactions. 
- Governments have intervened in the bond market, either as buyers or 
sellers, or by imposing controls of some sort. An important case occurs 
when governments want to prevent the reflection of a political (or 
economic) event on financial markets. 
- The econometric analysis is unable to identify break points relating to 
historical events, even though they are in the data. 
The next two sections illustrate the financial market approach by looking at 
a particular case, namely how the Nazis’ rise to power and the Second World 
War were reflected in the government bonds of France, Germany, Denmark 
and Norway. 
3. The Example of World War II 
Changes in financial values reflect historical events. The historical events con-
sidered here refer to a period starting with Hitler’s rise to power after his ap-
pointment as chancellor of the Reich on January 30, 1933 and including the 
first years of World War II. The analysis is based on newly collected price data 
of long-term government bonds for France, Germany, Denmark and Norway.7 
These prices were continuously quoted at this time on the financial markets in 
Stockholm and Zurich. All the nations directly or indirectly involved in the 
Second World War heavily interfered in, or even closed, their stock and bond 
exchanges. For reasons of neutrality, however, the Swiss and Swedish govern-
ments refrained from doing so and their financial markets therefore remained 
open and unrestricted for the entire wartime period.8  
There are some differences between the two data samples. First, they cover 
somewhat different time periods, with the German and French bonds in Zurich 
                                                             
7  For details on the bond data, see Frey and Kucher (2000) for the German and French bonds, 
and Waldenström and Frey (2007) for the Danish and Norwegian bonds. 
8  The Zurich Stock Exchange remained closed for two months following the German attack 
on the West in May and June 1940. 
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being analyzed from 1933 to 1948, and the Danish and Norwegian bonds 
traded in Stockholm only being analyzed from 1938 to 1940, i.e., the period 
right before and around the outbreak of the War. Naturally, this difference 
implies that the two samples allow for different historical questions, with the 
Nordic bond data primarily being suitable for the study of pre-war threat as-
sessments, and the German and French series allowing for broader inquiry. 
Moreover, the Zurich data are observed on a monthly basis while the Stock-
holm data are weekly. This difference in frequency does not matter greatly for 
the historical analysis, except for the slightly higher amount of detail in the 
timing of the estimated breaks in the Stockholm sample.  
The relationship between historical events and capital market developments 
is looked at from two different perspectives. On the one hand: To what extent 
are changes in government bond values related to historical events? Do breaks 
in such capital values series correspond to what have been established as cru-
cial events in the Second World War? Or are there breaks in the capital values 
series which cannot (or at least not easily) be related to War events? On the 
other hand: To what extent are historical events reflected in the form of 
changes in the values of government bonds? Do capital values rise or fall, and 
how large and significant are the changes? Are bonds issued by the various 
governments affected in the same or in a differentiated way? The answers to 
these questions may throw new light on the Second World War.  
Some historical events are generally undisputed, and their dating creates few 
problems. In our context, an example would be Hitler’s appointment to chan-
cellor, which occurred on January 30, 1933. Similarly, the unconditional ca-
pitulation of the Wehrmacht took place in Reims on May 7, 1945, and was 
repeated on May 9, 1945 in Berlin. Great care must nevertheless be taken not to 
distort the past. In particular, when decisions made by people in the past are 
evaluated, the much more limited knowledge existing at that particular time 
must be taken into account. This is particularly evident when decisions turn out 
to be wrong. Ex post facto, it is not easy, for instance, to understand why Hitler 
and his Wehrmacht invaded the Soviet Union, because, according to what we 
know from subsequent historical events, a defeat was almost inevitable. Histo-
rians are skilled and make an effort to overcome these dangers by carefully 
studying official and private documents, such as diaries, which are likely to be 
representative of the situation at a particular moment of time. But it is also well 
known that such documents are already the result of a selection process (with 
mainly those documents considered “important” being preserved), and some of 
them are even rewritten after the fact.  
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4. From Structural Breaks to Historical Facts 
4.1 Germany 
Figure 1 displays the German government bond prices for the period 1933-
1948. Over the whole period, there is a strong downturn of the value of German 
government bonds traded in Switzerland. This also holds for the period 1933-
1936, i.e. for the first years of the Third Reich. The drop in bond values be-
tween 1933 and 1935 may be attributed to the fact that bond holders may have 
feared that the Nazis would renegotiate foreign debt, or simply stop repayment. 
This fear was fuelled by official policy pronouncements advocating extreme 
autarchy, which indicated that the Nazis would withdraw from the international 
capital markets (Köllner 1982). In addition, heavy intervention in, and strict 
regulations imposed on, the capital markets on the part of Hitler’s government 
depressed the expectations of the bond holders, who suffered a decline in their 
returns (German economic policy in the pre-war and war period is discussed in 
e.g. Boelcke 1985, Köllner 1982). 
Figure 1: German government bond price index, 1933-1948 
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Source: Swiss National Bank, Monatsberichte, 1933-1948 
 
The partial recovery in 1937 and 1938 may be attributed to the (short-term) 
success of the expansionary fiscal policy (undertaken for rearmament pur-
poses): national income picked up, and unemployment fell sharply. A morato-
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rium on servicing foreign debt was imposed in the summer of 1933, but at the 
same time the government paid back foreign debts in an effort to become as 
autarchic as possible against foreign countries (again for military reasons). The 
Nazi government thereby gained some extent of financial respectability with 
foreign investors in 1937-38.  
Hitler’s aggressive foreign policy and increasing isolation led to a drastic 
fall in German bond prices from the middle of 1938 to the end of 1939, when 
the Second World War broke out. The bond traders feared that the impending 
war would reduce Germany’s willingness and ability to service and repay its 
foreign debt. Again there was a rise in the value of German government bonds 
after the successful Blitzkrieg at the beginning of 1940. But it did not last long: 
from the second half of 1941 on, there was a permanent fall in German bond 
values, suggesting that the actors on the bond market expected early on that the 
Nazis would lose the war, that the debt would no longer be serviced and that 
the capital would be lost. 
The econometric analysis identifies six break points for Germany. Table 1 
gives a survey of resulting break points and the corresponding percent changes 
in the conditional mean price index. 
Table 1: Structural break points and corresponding historical events:  
Germany 
 
Date 
Price change 
in percent 
 
Major events 
July 1936 + 8 %* Olympic Games in Berlin (30 July – 16 August) 
March 1939 – 17 %* Invasion of the Czech Republic (15 – 16 March) 
September 1939 – 39 %** Outbreak of WW II (1 Sept.) 
December 1941 – 5 %* Pearl Harbor, War Entry of the USA (7 – 11 Dec) 
November 1942 – 6 %** Russian offensive at Stalingrad (Nov – 2 Feb) 
February 1945 – 34 %** Yalta Conference (4 –11 February) 
Notes: Percent change in the conditional mean is presented (see text for details). * and ** 
indicate statistical significance at the 95- and 99-percent confidence level, respectively. 
Breaks are estimated using the method of Banerjee et al. (1992). 
 
German government bonds experienced a statistically significant and large 
upward surge, beginning in the summer and autumn of 1936. In July/August of 
that year, the conditional average index rose by 8 percent relative to the condi-
tional mean, i.e. the average development of all other government bonds traded 
on the Swiss market. This might be attributed to The Olympic Games, which 
were held in Berlin in August 1936, and which made the Nazi regime look 
peaceful to many observers.  
In mid-March 1939, the Nazis invaded the remaining parts of the Czecho-
slovak Republic (after the Sudetenland was given to them at the Munich Con-
ference, September 29, 1938). According to many historians (e.g., Weinberg, 
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1994), it heralded the beginning of the Second World War. The government 
bond markets support this interpretation of history. The value of German gov-
ernment bonds fell by no less than 17 percent compared to the average market 
values. The actors thus lost even more confidence in the German government’s 
capacity to service and pay back its bonds (which had already been seriously 
hampered before). The invasion of the Czechoslovak Republic was the first 
time Hitler annexed territory beyond the “German” borders, which was taken 
as an indication that he would not stop there, and that it was likely that a major 
war would be started. However, some amount of uncertainty remained; some 
actors on capital markets obviously thought that the annexation of the Czecho-
slovak Republic would satisfy Hitler’s demands. Accordingly, the value of 
German government bonds dropped only half as much as when the Second 
World War “officially” began on September 1, 1939 with German troops in-
vading Poland. The actual start of the war sent German government bonds 
plummeting down 39 percent. The capital market was extremely pessimistic 
about the prospects of a German victory. 
The Swiss stock exchange was closed in May/June 1940, so that the effect 
of the German Blitzkrieg-victories is not reflected in the data.  
The fourth structural break is identified in November/December 1941, but 
the decline of average bond prices is rather small (around 5 percent). It reflects 
a major war event, namely the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor (December 7, 
1941) and the subsequent declarations of war by the United States (and the 
United Kingdom) on Japan, and by Germany (and Italy) on the United States 
(December 8 and 11, respectively). 
Yet another significant drop in German bond values (again about 6 percent) 
occurred in November 1942. In that month, the Soviet troops started a large 
counter-offensive against the German 6th Army and parts of the 4th Panzer 
Army, encircling more than 300,000 German troops at Stalingrad. Traders on 
the Swiss capital market considered the launching of the offensive as having a 
more negative affect on Germany’s future ability to service and repay its debt 
than the capitulation by field marshal Friedrich Paulus three months later (Feb-
ruary 2, 1943).  
The last break point indicated by the data took place towards the end of the 
war, in February 1945. At the Yalta Conference, the Allied powers decided that 
only a complete capitulation of all German forces on all fronts would be ac-
cepted, and that Germany would be divided into three military occupation 
zones (at that time, France was not yet recognized as one of the World War 
victors). This was seen as the final blow to the Nazis (more so than the formal 
capitulation of the German military in May 1945) and resulted in a fall of Ger-
man bond prices by 34 percent. 
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4.2 France 
The bond prices of French government bonds, displayed in Figure 2, indicate a 
constant value until the middle of 1938, followed by a huge drop, coinciding 
with the “official” outbreak of War, invasion by German forces, and capitula-
tion (June 22, 1940). After trading was resumed at the Swiss bourse, the French 
bonds experienced a continuous increase in value until the end of 1945. The 
value of the French government bonds remained above 20 percent of the emis-
sion value, even though France suspended interest payments in November 
1942, and did not resume servicing its debts until the end of the period consid-
ered. The fact that French government bonds did not drop to zero shows rela-
tively high confidence on the part of the traders that France would re-emerge as 
an independent nation, would pay back its debts by the due date and resume 
paying interest. 
Figure 2: French government bond price index, 1933-1948 
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Source: Swiss National Bank, Monatsberichte, 1933-1948 
 
The econometric estimates identify five statistically significant break points 
for France (Table 2).  
French government bond values suffered a blow when the Germans occu-
pied the demilitarized Rheinland in May 1936. To some extent, the financial 
investors may have lost confidence in the ability of the French to successfully 
oppose the Nazi government’s aggressive policy. The “official” outbreak of 
World War II at the beginning of September 1939 reduced its bond values still 
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further. An even stronger fall in French government bonds occurred when 
France was defeated and occupied by the Germans in May and June 1940. The 
invasion of the Allied troops in Normandy in June 1944 was greeted as a deci-
sive sign of military and political recovery, and raised French government bond 
values. The negative break point in January 1946 is not related to any obvious 
political or military event. 
Table 2: Structural break points and corresponding historical events: France 
 
Date 
Price change in 
percent 
 
Major events 
May 1936 – 4 %* German Occupation of Rheinland 
September 1939 – 25 %** Outbreak of W.W. II 
May 1940 [ – 31 %] German Invasion of Belgium, France, Holland 
June 1944 + 16 %** Allied Invasion in Normandy 
January 1946 – 14 %** unknown 
Notes: See Table 1. [..] means the difference in the bond values between the day when trading 
was stopped and when it was resumed. For methodological reasons, it is not possible to iden-
tify such breaks with the econometric techniques used. 
4.3 Denmark 
Figure 3 shows the spread of the Danish government bond yield over the Swed-
ish government bond yield in the Stockholm bond market around 1938 to 1940. 
While the figures and tables for Germany and France just reported refer to 
bond prices, the following figures and tables for Denmark (and Norway) refer 
to bond yields. Bond prices and bond yields are inversely related: while an 
increase in sovereign risk is reflected by a fall in bond prices, it is reflected by 
a rise in bond yields. Moreover, the size of breaks is measured by a percent 
change in bond prices, and by a percentage change in yields. The same change 
in sovereign risk is thus reflected in a lower figure in the case of bond yields 
than in the case of bond prices. For example, an improvement in sovereign risk, 
resulting in a doubling of bond prices (+ 100%), means that the bond yield falls 
by half, say from 10% to 5%, i.e., a fall of 5 percentage points. 
Evidently, there were no fears among investors about the repayment of Dan-
ish bonds during all of 1938. In March 1939, however, the first sign of distur-
bance is indicated by a small, yet significant, structural break point, reported in 
Table 3. This break is recorded immediately after the German annexation of 
Czechoslovakia, and can be explained when taking into consideration that 
Germany and Denmark had geographical and historical ties that resembled 
those between Germany and Czechoslovakia. The actual outbreak of War in 
September 1939 did not have much affect on the Danish yield spread, mainly 
because the Swedish yields (i.e., sovereign risk) also increased at that time. 
What did matter, disproportionately to the assessed war threat to Denmark, 
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however, was the Soviet attack on Finland in late November the same year. 
The Danish spreads jumped up by a statistically significant 2.1 percentage 
points in early December 1939, which coincides closely with the outbreak of 
the Finnish Winter War. In other words, the Swedish contemporaries perceived 
the aggression against Finland as a bad sign for the future prospects of the 
Danish government being able (or willing) to service its debt obligations to 
foreign bondholders. Given the close connection to wartime events, this can 
then be interpreted as an increased assessed risk of war to Denmark. 
Figure 3: Danish government bond yield spread, 1938-1940 
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Table 3: Structural break points and corresponding historical events: Den-
mark 
 
Date 
Spread change in 
percentage units 
  
Major events 
March 1939 + 0.8 %** Invasion of the Czech Republic (15 – 16 March) 
November 1940 + 1.3 %** Soviet attack on Finland (30 Nov) 
April 1940 + 1.6 %** German invasion of Denmark (9 April) 
Notes: A positive sign of the estimated break, i.e., a spread increase, implies increased war 
risk. Breaks are estimated using the method of Bai and Perron (1998, 2003). 
 
The final significant structural break in the Danish yields is recorded in 
early April 1940, i.e., at the time of the German invasion of Denmark on April 
 345
9, 1940. This break point bears a lot of information when compared to the 
earlier break points in the Danish series. The reason is that, although the con-
temporaries had perceived notable increases in the war threats on Denmark 
before the German invasion, they did still not fully believe it would happen. If 
they had, there would never have been any additional spread increase, i.e., 
sovereign risk increase, when the war on Denmark eventually broke out. In this 
way, we can infer the assessed likelihood of a war outbreak in the eyes of the 
contemporaries during the pre-war era by relating the observed market yields at 
the time of the outbreak and the pre-war yields (for further details, see Walden-
ström and Frey, 2007).  
4.4 Norway 
Figure 4 shows the yield spreads of Norwegian government bonds traded in 
Stockholm for 1938-1940. Broadly speaking, the evolution of the spreads in 
Norway in this turbulent era resembles the corresponding evolution in Den-
mark. Before the German invasion of Norway on April 9, 1940, the financial 
markets in Stockholm seem to have perceived a constant build-up of war 
threats to Norway. Three positive structural breaks indicate this, as reported in 
Table 4. First, in March 1939, there is a small, but significant increase in the 
Norwegian spread, which may be related to the German annexation of Czecho-
slovakia. Second, there is a larger significant structural break estimated at the 
end of August 1939, directly after the non-aggression pact between Germany 
and the Soviet Union (the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact) and right before the Ger-
man attack on Poland. Third, there is a break dated in late December, which 
coincides in time with recent war activities between Finland and the Soviet 
Union. In other words, financial markets clearly perceived an increased war 
threat to Norway well ahead of the actual war outbreak in 1940. 
However, the Norwegian yield spreads in Stockholm also contain two sig-
nificant structural breaks in 1940. The first shows a large positive break, i.e., 
signaling an increased risk of a Norwegian sovereign default, dated late April 
1940. This break is clearly associated with the German invasion of that month. 
Notably, as in the case of Denmark, this break suggests that the contemporaries 
were not convinced that Norway would eventually be involved in the War, 
because that would have implied that yield spreads should not have changed 
significantly in response to the invasion. A fifth and final break is dated August 
1940. The exact date of this break is uncertain due to the volatile bond prices of 
Norwegian bonds after the German invasion (most likely due to low levels of 
trading). Still, it coincides with the surrender of the Norwegian military resis-
tance to the invaders, and interestingly it seems as if the bond market actors 
interpreted this major blow to the Norwegian sovereignty as positive for the 
likelihood of their bonds being serviced by the Norwegian government. 
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Figure 4: Norwegian government bond yield spread, 1938-1940 
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
1200
1938:01 1938:06 1938:11 1939:04 1939:09 1940:02 1940:07 1940:12
S
p
re
a
d
 o
v
e
r 
S
w
e
d
is
h
 b
o
n
d
 y
ie
ld
 (
in
 b
a
si
s 
p
o
in
ts
)
Czech annexation
(Mar. 1939)
Molotov-Ribbentrop
(Aug. 1939)
Soviet-Finnish War
(Nov. 1939)
German invasion
(Apr. 1940)
Resistance ends
(Aug. 1940)
 
Source: Affärsvärlden, 1938-1940. 
 
Table 4: Structural break points and corresponding historical events: 
Norway 
 
Date 
Spread change in 
percentage units 
 
Major events 
March 1939 + 0.2 %* Invasion of the Czech Republic (15 – 16 March) 
August 1939 + 1.0 %* Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (26 Aug) 
December 1939 + 0.1 %** Soviet attack on Finland (30 Nov) 
April 1940 + 2.0 %** German invasion of Denmark (9 April) 
August 1940 – 0.6 %** Norwegian resistance surrenders (July/August) 
Notes: See Table 3. 
5. From Historical Facts to Structural Breaks 
The above sections present the empirical results of the financial market ap-
proach to analyzing history. Several interesting findings are revealed. Some of 
the events that are generally thought to be crucial are clearly reflected in the 
German and French government bond prices. This holds, in particular, for the 
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official outbreak of the war from July to September 1939. It markedly reduced 
the government bond values of Germany (by 39 percent) and France (by 25 
percent). The same holds for losses and gains of national sovereignty. When 
Belgium and France were defeated and occupied by German forces in the Blitz-
krieg of May 1940, the German government bond values rose by 8 percent and 
those of France fell by no less than 31 percent. The same holds in the case of 
the two Nordic countries analyzed, Denmark and Norway. The German inva-
sion in April 1940 was clearly noticeable on the bond market, with sharp in-
creases in the perceived risk of a sovereign default, according to falls in the 
countries’ bonds.  
At the same time, we also note that certain events to which historians attach 
great importance are not reflected in bond prices at all: the most prominent 
example is the capitulation of the Wehrmacht in May 1945, which is neither 
reflected in the German nor French government bond prices. The Allied inva-
sion in Normandy in June 1944 raised the French bond values (by 16 percent) 
but did not lead to a break in the values for Germany. In the case of Denmark, 
the non-aggression pact between Germany and Denmark at the end of May 
1939 did not influence the bond market’s perception concerning war risks on 
Denmark at all. 
Finally, the results indicate situations where the claims of historians may 
even be questioned by the financial market evidence. For example, Nordic 
historians have regularly argued that the contemporaries in the Nordic countries 
did not perceive any increased risk of war to their own countries in the period 
before the war, i.e., in 1939 and early 1940.9 By contrast, the estimated struc-
tural breaks for both Denmark and Norway clearly indicate that the sovereign 
risk of these countries increased significantly in connection with war-related 
geopolitical events, and could be clearly interpreted as increasing the military 
threat against these countries.  
6. Comparison 
The above discussion reveals that the traditional historiography and the finan-
cial market method approach history from very different points of view. De-
spite this fundamental difference, the two approaches share the fact that they 
both rely on interpretation – but what must be interpreted differs considerably. 
Standard historical research has to interpret the reliability and meaning of 
the documents studied and interviews with the decision makers at that time. 
Historians are trained to do this very carefully in order to understand what was 
                                                             
9  For references and quotes of more than a dozen Nordic Second World War historians, see 
Waldenström and Frey (2007). 
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thought at the time and not confound the situation with information available 
only after the fact. This is sometimes extremely difficult, if not impossible. For 
instance, today’s historians must seek to understand why the Nazi government 
engaged in war, even knowing that they would lose.  
The financial market approach is based on data only containing the know-
ledge available at the respective time; subsequent time only enters into the 
equation through the expectations of the market participants, again at the re-
spective time. The financial market approach is not faced with the problems of 
standard historical approach, but has other major problems of interpretation. In 
addition to the problems common to econometric estimations, the most impor-
tant ones are:  
- Why are some of the break points identified not related to any major 
political or historical event (such as the negative break point in January 
1946 for French government bonds)? 
- Why are some important historical facts not visible as break points 
(such as the capitulation of the Wehrmacht in May 1945)? 
A handy explanation refers to the notion that financial market values do not 
show any reactions or breaks if the traders already took the respective historical 
events into account, i.e. if they are already “priced in”. This may, for example, 
be argued for the German capitulation, which was imminent, and which traders 
saw coming some considerable time before May 1945. Such an explanation 
makes sense, but it is somewhat ad hoc. The same could be said of other 
events, such as, for example, the invasion of Normandy. It has still not been 
explained why this event (positively) affected the value of the French govern-
ment bonds only, but did not affect the value of the German bonds. 
Another issue of interpretation is due to the government bond market captur-
ing the expectations of a special group of people active in these markets. These 
are not only the actual traders working on these financial markets. The group 
involved comprises a much larger group of actors influencing the supply and 
demand of these assets. It is not known who the buyers and sellers on the gov-
ernment bond market were during the period in question. It may well be, of 
course, that these actors differed substantially from the political and military 
decision makers, who were responsible for war activity. The approach may 
allow us to identify not only the motivations of persons interested in financial 
prosperity, and hence presumably the economic prosperity of a country, but 
also the motivations of politicians and the military, which might have more 
narrow interests and might be subject to over-optimism and hubris.  
7. Conclusion 
The two approaches to analyzing history discussed here – the standard histo-
riographic approach and the financial market approach – each have their spe-
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cific strengths and weaknesses. Without doubt, a careful study of documents 
and interviews with the decision makers at the time can reveal important in-
sights. In many cases, it is the only feasible and reasonable method. In the case 
of the Nazi rise to power and the Second World War, it is indispensable to 
consider what was written and said at the time by the political and military 
decision makers. Still, when it comes to representing widely held pre-war 
threat assessments, an in-depth interpretation of a few written sources is hardly 
sufficient for capturing the views and opinions of the public at the time.  
The financial market approach presented here may, in such cases, be a use-
ful, and perhaps, so far, underutilized, complementary method, offering addi-
tional insights. For example, it was found that some of the conventional histo-
riography concerning the widely held pre-war threat assessments in the Nordic 
countries disagrees with the estimates of the corresponding threat assessments 
according to the contemporary financial markets. But this approach also suffers 
from potential methodological problems with, e.g., the econometric methods 
used, which rely on choices and assumptions that are questionable. Therefore, 
the two approaches should not be seen as exclusive of each other, but rather as 
helping us to see specific aspects of history more clearly and in a different 
light. 
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